Basically every government has access to personal data, even the ones with strict privacy policies.
For instance ToS;DR Data is stored in Germany and the US (Phoenix in the US, Forum in Germany), by law we have to give the government access to data, granted they have a warrant.
I would say that point is already linked to a case that fits well.
Personal data is shared with government agencies if there’s a lawful order, and the user acknowledges that data may be shared without their consent or without being notified.
Given that, what would matter to the user would be if the service is located in a country where users’ data is often requested or not ( i.e. if the terms are governed by a jurisdiction falling under case 242 or case 241).
But in my opinion, Case 189 is only about the people who work there (noted as neutral and not blocker) and if I were to be a user of this service, I would want to be aware that my data is being shared voluntarily with the government (including the NSA and other government agencies).
For me, Case 242 does not have enough impact on the collaboration of this service with the government.
But I fully understand that it doesn’t merit the creation of a point.
There could also be a ‘good’ point: this service uses a warrant canary. Couldn’t be weighted too strong because the assurances are weak, but it might get at what this discussion is about.